It had to be expected long ago, and it had to have happened years ago. To conclude the case of 30 years of Mubarak autocracy in one sentence, I should say simply the following: the Egyptians did not deserve this fate.
Speaking with an Egyptian friend a few years ago, I opposed his idea that the country was a political dictatorship; I specified that Egypt was a social ‘dictatorship’, and this is actually all that the successive Mubarak administrations systematically implemented. But it was futile; it would end one day or another, without leaving any positive memories.
The entire problem originates from just one word. Understanding this word, under the terms it was perceived by the local rulers and socio-economic elite, one can realize why an empty, undeserved, three (3) decades long period happened to Egypt.
Ibrahim Nafie, former banker peremptorily appointed atop of the venerated Al Ahram newspaper – a socio-political institution of Egypt – used the key word in one of his interviews that was published years ago. Speaking of the Egyptian president, Ibrahim Nafie specified:
- Mubarak is Mister Stability.
The assessment was very accurate and absolutely correct; the policy was calamitous. Stability at any price can never bring forth positive results.
President Mubarak lived as vice-president of Egypt the dramatic events of President Anwar al Sadat’s assassination; when his president was standing, being shot, Vice-president Mubarak and the rest were flat on the ground, hidden by the chairs, in an effort to survive. This attitude prevailed for 30 years with Mubarak’s advent to the Egyptian presidency. This clearly means that it was a regime of fear. National parades were therefore cancelled to make sure that the predecessor’s fate would not fall on the successor! That was mean and miserable, reflecting a counterfeit Egypt that could not be accepted by the quasi-totality of the Egyptian people.
Usually, the term ‘regime of fear’ designates a grave totalitarian authority. It means fear imposed by the political authority over the entire society; quite contrarily to that, in the case of Mubarak’s Egypt, the fear prevailed among the top political authority itself. This produced a particularity; the ‘regime’ did not properly ‘rule’ as per their ideas, theories, ideologies and political – economic choices, but out of fear of losing the power.
With all my personal experience in Greece (in the 60s and the 70s), Turkey (in the 80s and 90s) and Egypt (in the 90s and the 2000s), if I compare the Mubarak autocracy with either General Kenan Evren’s despotism in Turkey in the early 80s (before the politicization brought about by Premier Turgut Ozal) or Colonel George Papadopoulos’ and Lieutenant Dimitrios Ioannides’ dictatorship in Greece between 1967 – 1974 (before the return of Constantine Caramanlis and the re-instauration of parliamentarian life), I find the terminating Egyptian regime less totalitarian than the Turkish and Greek examples.
In Turkey and Greece, the said regimes imposed ideas, ideologies, concepts of life, and world conceptions on the entire populations. In Egypt, the Mubarak regime made it possible for the socio-economic elite to live as per Western standards (in striking contradiction with the beliefs and the convictions of the outright majority of the Egyptian people), and simply put in jail those who with action or flagrant public speech threatened the continuation of the said social order.
As it can be surmised through the lines of the above paragraph, one cannot fairly describe such a regime as a real dictatorship. Acting in the aforementioned manner, the Mubarak administration made many concessions to the society and the political opponents. More the time passed more concessions were made. At the end, the political opponents were merely asked to speak free and criticize everything, sparing only the President’s family.
As the time passed, the systematic loosening of the public order became evident; Egyptians started showing their opposition not at the political level but in their daily lives. It became normal to drive in the opposite lane and face no consequence! Few perceived this as a real threat for the country, because the political opposition parties and leaders were concerned with the possible ways to corner Mubarak at the political level, and the Mubarak administration cared only to prolong the socio-political status through more compromises.
The ensuing result was that almost everyone managed to live in their places without any true perspectives; the socioeconomic divergence became colossal, particularly after the identification of the modernized ICT sector as a new pool of fabulous wealth for the socioeconomic elite. This was behind the ominous choice of raising Dr. Ahmed Nazif, an insensitive technocrat and a senseless bureaucrat, to premiership.
The privileged elite put all the stakes on Egypt’s modernization but they did not mean it as a means of overall social progress; satellite cities emerged around Cairo in the example of 6th October City (Rehab City, Kattamia, etc.) whereby the lifestyle would be far beyond the average Egyptian’s craziest dream. This solidified the belief among average people that the socioeconomic elite were utterly immoral.
In the eyes of the average people, the immorality of the socioeconomic elite had more to do with the lavish villas with the latest California-level equipment and less to do with the non-observance of hedjab (Islamic veil) and the consumption of alcoholic drinks that characterized the elite. The state functioned exclusively to protect the interests of the few privileged, not only by serving and favouring them but also by preventing the middle class from profitable business; this reached the paranoid level of prohibiting anyone from opening a fish restaurant in the Corniche of Alexandria because this business activity would immediately signify lower income for the few elite businessmen who had already got a licence to run fish restaurants in the said area.
Egypt’s socioeconomic elite was very small, the middle class meagre and duly subordinated, and the people totally dissociated from the former. Indicatively, an inhabitant of the lavish island district of Zamalek may have lived 30 or 50 years without crossing the streets of Imbaba, a poor district on Nile’s western shore no more than 1km far from Zamalek.
In a huge country (the total area being ca. 1 million km2) of approximately 82 million people, the socioeconomic elite totalled at the most ca. 200000 people, who were scattered in a) few districts of Cairo (Zamalek, Maadi, Masr Guedida or Heliopolis, Madinet Nasr, Mohandessin, Dokki, and Mansuriya in Giza), b) the satellite cities of Cairo, c) few districts and suburbs of Alexandria (Shellallat, Kafr Abdou, Sidi Gaber, Semouha, Maamoura, Marina), and d) segregated resort areas in the Red Sea coast (Sharm el Sheikh, Ayn Sokhna, Hurghada, etc.). It is noteworthy that the aforementioned districts’ territory does not represent even 0.1% of the country’s area.
What would and did beat an observer was the said elite’s renunciation of their own country; either youth, middle-aged or elder, these people really and deeply reviled their own country under a tragic-comical pretext: it was ‘’poor”. They never travelled outside the aforementioned areas even if 5 stars tourism infrastructure was available (notably in El Minya, Luxor, Aswan and Abu Simbel).
The aforementioned situation did characterize all the economic sectors; I will herewith offer an example taken from the sector of Tourism. In Mediterranean countries like Turkey, Greece and Italy, Tourism is viewed as an essential tool of socioeconomic progress and development for the entire population. Ministries and/or organizations of Tourism spearheaded tourism development by duly educating and effectively capacitating local people in rural settlements, small villages, isolated islands, and remote mountain hamlets to turn their own houses to small local hotels featuring standard services and nice cafes & restaurants.
Contrarily to these earlier pursued and successful policies, Egypt developed Tourism in the 80s and the 90s in a most unfortunate manner; the only benefit the average Egyptian could take from Tourism was employment, be it in the form of hotel / travel agency employee or souvenirs and services seller (small merchants). The middle and lower classes were not given a chance to entrepreneurship in Tourism. Hotels ‘’had” to be 5 stars edifices built in big cities or in desert coastlands far from the average Egyptian.
Quite indicative is what happened at Kom Ombo, in the deep south of Egypt, ca. 40 km before Aswan (860 km south of Cairo). There is an important and magnificent temple of Haroeris and Sokar at Kom Ombo, which is a small town of ca. 60000 people. If methods pursued in Italy, Greece and Turkey – for the benefit of the middle and lower classes – were pursued here, there would be many small 2 or 3 stars hotels built at Kom Ombo (or local people would transform their buildings or parts of them into hotels and restaurants). This would pump good money to the people of Kom Ombo, raising their standards of life, as Tourism helped achieve in Siracusa (Italy), Gytheion (Greece) and Alanya (Turkey).
But instead of this, Kom Ombo was left without any hotel, without any tourist infrastructure, and with impoverished inhabitants; one observer studying the case objectively would be left with the impression that Egypt’s elite almost hated the people of Kom Ombo and wished Kom Omboans have never existed.
Tourists were sent to big 5 stars hotels in Aswan, notably the illustrious historical Hotel Cataract, New Cataract Hotel, Kalabsha, Basma, Oberoi, Isis, Amun Island – Club Mediterranee, and Isis Island Hotel, the latter being property of the Pyramisa group whose main shareholder (is) was Alaa Mubarak, son of the president.
From there, in organized tours, tourists were transported to Kom Ombo to briefly visit the temple and immediately return to Aswan (or proceed to Edfu, Esna and Luxor in order to stay in Luxor overnight) without staying in Kom Ombo city even for one minute. This improper and shameful version of Tourism disconnected from the local population and landscape was repeated ceaselessly, leaving to the people of Kom Ombo the shamefully minimal income of souvenirs and postcards sold at the entrance of the temple.
Small businessmen from Aswan were allowed to open small travel agencies or 2 stars hotels for backpackers and were catastrophically disoriented from big tourism business (which would be possible by means of joint ventures) because this would threaten the elite’s privileges. However, there was a clear divide between Aswan small businessmen and Kom Ombo small businessmen, and the latter were therefore twice discriminated.
The personal friends of President Mubarak and his sons set up joint ventures with multinational chains of Tourism (Oberoi, Sofitel, Hyatt, Sheraton, Hilton, Intercontinental, etc.) totally eliminating medium and small businessmen from making really profitable business to the benefit of the entire country; ironically, had they thought differently, they would have generated the conditions of their staying longer in power. But, as it happened elsewhere so many times, greed is a very bad advisor.
The political system functioned for two main purposes, namely to perpetuate the above described, unacceptable socio-economic situation, and to serve foreign policy instructions given by the ambassadors of the US, England and France with the help of their German and Japanese counterparts. This model greatly damaged the country in all aspects, further dissociating both the weak middle classes (ca. 20% of the entire population), and the impoverished lower classes that represent more than two thirds (2/3) of the entire population.
Egypt was a very bad reading of the ‘2/3 society model’ from the part of the socioeconomic elite; had they truly found ways to strengthen part of the middle classes and integrate them into the system, the situation would have been different. The ‘2/3 society model’ was read by Mubarak’s sons and their idiotic, uneducated, and uncultured friends, as ‘1/1000 society model’; this helped them make huge properties within fractions of a second; but it goes without saying that such a ‘model’ is practically unsustainable.
For more than two decades the Egyptian people felt that he lived in a country that deprived them from socioeconomic progress and from authentic political expression at the local, regional and global level. Of course, as far as the latter parameter is concerned, the Egyptians, the Spaniards and the English (and many other nations) face the same situation, because the governmental foreign policy was overwhelmingly rejected by the outright majority of the local population in all these cases – as it happened on the occasion of the deceitful US-led war against Iraq. But the combination of all the aforementioned parameters drove the Egyptians to the belief that they were living in an alien country that did not represent them at all.
In this regard, the extremely low participation in the parliamentary and presidential elections should have been taken by the socio-economic elite as a serious warning and as an ominous sign; but it was not!
Although the extremely low participation in the elections showed the mild character of the regime (no forced participation took place), the fact alone demonstrated brilliantly the unbridgeable gap that separated already the socio-economic elite from the outright majority of the Egyptian people.
Even worse, the socio-economic rise of a network of personal friends of President Mubarak’s sons’ friends produced the image of some alien Egyptians who, although they desperately tried to demonstrate their Egyptian identity at the behavioural level, were totally unrelated to any aspect of Egyptian culture, having become hollow images of average Americans.
Throughout History, Egypt has brought about many aspects of civilization that are all parts of today’s Egyptian Cultural Heritage; but Alaa and Gamal Mubarak’s friends and their subservient flatterers ignored them all, and showed no interest to associate themselves with any.
You could have asked them to speak about the Campaigns of Thutmose III, the Book of the Hours, the Coptic Chronicle, the History of Tabari, the Travels of Ibn Battuta or the novels of Naguib Mahfuz; in all cases, they would have remained speechless and unable to formulate a substantially informative answer. You could have asked them about Nuh, the Biblical and Islamic Prophet Noah, getting the response that …..
- He was someone with a felucca!
The alienation was total, and therefore the days left to this regime were numbered. What occurred in Egypt for some years was that the system in place was functioning just out of earlier acquired speed. But the majority of the functionaries, the largest part of the administrative machine, and the lower layers of the police and the military (up to a level of 75% of the officers) reviled deeply and definitely the socioeconomic elite and the upper layers of the apparatus that were of course intertwined with the socioeconomic elite.
This was masterfully highlighted by the fact that in the evening of Friday 28th of January many police officers in Cairo and throughout the country set fire and burnt their own police stations and offices, which were of course deeply hated by the people. This simply shows that they were forced – due to the hierarchical structure of the state machine – to execute orders that they greatly reviled as unjust, unfair and unpopular.
The regime was therefore effectively deprived of the ability to properly deal with a social crisis, due to its progressively reduced or finally vanished social basis.
Some may assert that, despite the fast and precipitated departure of many corrupt economic and political paragons of the regime, it is too early to speak about the ‘’collapse of Mubarak’s regime”; however, the overwhelming desire of the quasi-totality of the Egyptian people imposes the president’s resignation and immediate replacement by the Vice-President of Omar Suleiman, and the subsequent proclamation of constitutional elections free to all political parties.
Certainly, the urgent priority is social safety and urgent return to normal daily life; the burned cars have already been removed from the streets of Cairo during Sunday, 30th of January. But it will take more than some tanks in the basic arteries of Cairo to reinstitute social order; in this regard, the Vice-President and the new government must demonstrate to the Egyptian people as soon as possible that the people’s voice has been clearly and unmistakably heard. The longer this is not shown the worse for Egypt.
The regime is not yet clinically defunct; but History has already expressed its definite, irreversible and absolutely negative verdict: it was one of Egypt’s worst, one of the bleakest moments of the Egyptian History.
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